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SHO ULD YOUR ERISA REMEDY DEPEND
UPON YOUR GEOGRAPHY?: AN ANALYSIS
OF RUSH PRUDENTIAL HMO, INC. V.
MORAN
Amanda M. Schulz
INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA), in response to the proliferation of employee welfare
and pension benefit plans during the middle part of the twentieth
century.' Concerned with the increasingly interstate nature of such
plans and their effect on the well-being of millions of the nation's
citizens, Congress sought to protect employees and their dependents
through disclosure and vesting requirements and safeguards with
respect to the establishment, operation and administration of the
plans.2  Concurrent with these goals, ERISA seeks to provide
uniformity, predictability and equity through federal law rather than
allowing employee welfare and pension benefit plans to be governed
by the laws of fifty different states.3 States, however, concomitant with
their police powers, have enacted laws governing insurance and other
employee benefit plans that occasionally conflict with the provisions of
ERISA. As a result, the courts must decide which statute controls.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides
that when a federal law conflicts with a state law the federal law will
control.4 The federal law in this situation is said to preempt the state
law The United States Supreme Court has ruled on the preemptive
1. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
5. Barron's Law Dictionary, 383 (1996).
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effect of ERISA on several occasions.6 ERISA is rare among federal
statutes in that it explains the extent of its preemption of state law. In
section 514(a), the law provides that "the provisions of [title I] and title
IV shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan, 7 covered under ERISA.
However, state laws that "relate to" ERISA plans are saved from
preemption if they "regulate insurance" under ERISA's saving clause.8
ERISA's deemer clause further limits this exception from preemption
by providing that an employee benefit plan may not "be deemed to be
an insurance company or other insurer ... or to be engaged in the
business of insurance." 9
During the first twenty years of ERISA's enactment the Supreme
Court espoused a broad reading of "relate to" preemption under
section 514.10 More recently, the Court acknowledged that its prior
attempts to construe the phrase "relate to", provided an insufficient
dividing point in determining whether a particular state law ought to
be preempted by ERISA.' In applying "relate to" preemption and the
saving and deemer clauses, many recent decisions focus primarily on
Congressional intent.
Despite the Supreme Court's attempts to clarify preemption issues, a
split developed in the Circuit Courts regarding state laws which require
independent external review of medical necessity determinations made
by Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). At present over forty
states and the District of Columbia have laws requiring such
independent reviews. 12  As a result, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari 3 to resolve the conflict between the circuits.
6. See generally infra notes 11, 31, and 33.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
8. Id.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)(2)(B) (2000).
10. See Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Department of Ins., 215 F.3d 526,
532-33 (5th Cir. 2000).
11. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995).
12. See ALASKA STAT. § 21.07.050 (Michie 2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-
2537 (West 2000); CAL. INS. CODE § 10169 (West 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-
113.5 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-478n (2001); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 16, § 9119
(2000); D.C. CODE § 32-571.7 (2000); 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 00-257; GA. CODE ANN. §
33-20A-32 (2000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 432E-6 (2000); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT 125/4-10
(2000); IND. INS. CODE ANN. § 27-13-10.1-1 (West 2000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 514J
(West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-22a13 (2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-
623 (Michie 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:3081 (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN., tit. 24-A, § 4312 (West 2000); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-10A-01 ( 2001);
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A-.First, this Note examines some of the jurisprudence regarding
ERISA preemption. Second, this Note discusses the Supreme Court's
recent cases analyzing the effect of ERISA's preemption provisions as
they relate to state laws. Third, this Note considers the opinion
reached by the Fifth Circuit in Corporate Health Insurance, Inc. v.
Texas Department of Health.14 Fourth, this Note analyzes the Seventh
Circuit's recent decision in Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.,5 that
created a split in the circuits, and argues that the Seventh Circuit
provided an analysis that relied on flawed reasoning. Finally, this Note
discusses the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran1 6 and concludes that it allows ERISA
remedies that are dependent upon geography.
II. PRIOR LAW
A. The ERISA Statute
ERISA regulates certain pension benefit and employee welfare
plans. The law extends to plans that "through the purchase of
insurance or otherwise [provide] medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits" for plan participants and beneficiaries.17 ERISA does not
require employers to provide any given number of minimum benefits.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1760, § 14 (Law. Co-op. 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
550.1907 (2001); MINN. STAT. § 62Q.73 (2000); Mo. REV. STAT. § 376.1385 (2000);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-37-102 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-J:5 (2000); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 26:2S-11 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10.17.24 (Michie 2000); N.Y.
INS. LAW § 4904 (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-50-62 (1999); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1751.84 (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2528.3 (2000); 2001
Or. Laws ch. 266, § 8; 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 991.2162 (1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-
17.12-10 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-71-1970 (Law Co-op. 2000); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 56-32-227 (2001); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.58A (Vernon Supp. 2001);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-629 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4089 (2001); VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.2-5901 et. seq. (Michie 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.43.535
(West 2001); W. VA. CODE § 33-25C-6 (2001); and Wis. STAT. § 632.835 (2000).
13. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 533 U.S. 948 (2001).
14. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir.
2000).
15. Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2000).
16. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000).
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Rather, it controls the administration of benefit plans18 through the
imposition of reporting and disclosure directives,' 9 funding standards,
21participation and vesting requirements and fiduciary responsibilities
22for plan administrators. In addition to providing for these
administrative oversight functions, ERISA imposes criminal sanctions
and sets up a civil enforcement plan.23 Finally, ERISA preempts some
state law.24
Section 514(a) provides that ERISA "shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they.. .relate to any employee benefit plan"
covered by the statute.25 However, under ERISA's savings clause,
state laws that 'relate to' employee benefit plans can nonetheless be
saved from preemption if they 'regulate insurance. 26  Through this
mechanism state insurance laws are saved from preemption.
This result is consistent with the McCarran-Ferguson Act which
provides that "the continued regulation.. .by the several States of the
business of insurance is in the public interest., 27 In Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts," the Supreme Court applied a three-factor
analysis based on the McCarran-Ferguson Act to determine the scope
of the savings clause. The three factors are: first, "whether the practice
has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; second,
whether it is an integral part of the policy relationship between the
insurer and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to
entities in the insurance industry."29 These factors need not all be met
in order to determine that a particular law regulates insurance.30
Though the factors are "considerations weighed, 3 the Court has
directed that "none of these criteria is necessarily determinative in
18. Id. § 1001(b).
19. Id. §§ 1051-1061.
20. Id. §§ 1081-1086.
21. Id. §§ 1051-1061.
22. Id. §§ 1101-1114.
23. Id. §§ 1131-1145.
24. Id. § 1144.
25. Id. § 1144(a).
26. Id. § 1144(b)(4).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2000).
28. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
29. Id. at 743.
30. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982).
31. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 49 (1987).
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itself. 32 Using these factors, if a particular practice constitutes the
business of insurance, it is saved from preemption and left to state
regulation.33
Finally, even if a state law is saved using the saving clause and the
McCarran-Ferguson factors, it may still be preempted if it falls under
ERISA's deemer clause. The deemer clause provides that for
purposes of applying the saving clause, a plan cannot "be deemed to be
an insurance company or other insurer,. . . or be engaged in the
business of insurance."3 The Supreme Court interpreted this clause to
mean that a state law initially saved from preemption through the
saving clause is ultimately preempted to the extent that it relates to
plans not funded through insurance.
B. The Evolution of 'Relate to' Preemption
During the first twenty years after the enactment of ERISA, the
provision regarding 'relate to' preemption was construed broadly to
reach any state law having a connection with, or reference to, covered
employee plans.36 However, recent cases have prompted the Supreme
Court to recognize that its prior attempts to construe the phrase 'relate
to' provide little guidance in deciding preemption cases because
"really, universally, relations stop nowhere."37 In essence, the Court
recognized that nearly any state law in this area would be preempted
as having a connection with or some reference to an ERISA plan.
In 1995 the Supreme Court decided New York State Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co. 38 In this
case, the Court determined that it must "look instead to the objectives
of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that
Congress understood would survive." 9 In Travelers Insurance Co., a
New York law required hospitals to collect additional charges for
services provided to patients covered by commercial carriers and other
HMOs but not for services provided to patients covered under Blue
Cross/Blue Shield plans.4° The law further imposed a surcharge on
32. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982).
33. Metropolitan Life v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1999).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(B) (2000).
35. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
36. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); See also District of
Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
37. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. at 655.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 656.
40. See id. at 649.
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HMOs that "varie[d] depending on the number of eligible Medicaid
recipients an HMO has enrolled., 41 The purpose of the additional
charges was to encourage the HMOs to admit more Medicaid patients
to their plans.42
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the charges
"relate[d] to ERISA because they impose a significant economic
burden on commercial insurers and HMOs. They therefore have an
impermissible impact on ERISA plan structure and administration.,
43
The Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's approach and
observed that the indirect, economic burdens in Travelers Insurance
Co. did "not bind plan administrators to any particular choice and thus
function as a regulation of an ERISA plan itself"44 but rather simply
affected the costs and benefits of selecting one plan over another.4'5 As
a result, the Supreme Court held that the New York statute was not
preempted by ERISA.46
Three years later in California Division of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc.47 the Supreme
Court was again called upon to rule on the preemption of a state
statute by ERISA. Dillingham involved a challenge to a California law
requiring public works contractors to pay a prevailing wage while
allowing lower wages for apprenticeship programs.48 A unanimous
Supreme Court held that the law was not subject to preemption
because it constituted only the regulation of an underlying industry of
which the employers were members. 49 The Court rooted its holding in
the "assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not
to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."50
Four months after the Court's decision in Dillingham, the Court
upheld another state law that had been challenged under ERISA.5" In
DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Services Fund the
41. Id. at 650.
42. See id.
43. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 721 (2d Cir. 1993).
44. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. at 659.
45. Id. at 660.
46. Id. at 645.
47. California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Construction, N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
4& Id.
49. Id. at 334.
50. Id. at 325.
51. DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997).
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Supreme Court upheld a New York statute exacting a tax on gross
receipts for patient services at health care facilities. 2 The Court held
that the state law was not the type of law Congress intended ERISA to
preempt. 3 Rather, it deemed the statute to be one of many "'state
laws' of general applicability that impose some burdens on the
administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless do not 'relate to' them
within the meaning of the governing statute. 5 4  Once again, the
Court's resolution turned on Congressional intent.
In analyzing the Congressional objectives in passing the ERISA
statute, the Court has made several findings. In Ingersoll-Rand v.
McClendon,5 the Court found that in passing section 514(a), Congress
intended:
to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform
body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and
financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States
or between States and the Federal Government..., [and to prevent] the
potential for conflict in substantive law... requiring the tailoring of
plans and employer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each
jurisdiction. 6
One of the Act's sponsors, Representative Dent, further described
Congress' objective as "to eliminat[e] the threat of conflicting and
inconsistent State and local regulation."57 Senator Williams reiterated
the point saying that "with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill,
the substantive and enforcement provisions . . . are intended to
preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of
conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee
benefit plans."" Thus, as the Supreme Court pointed out, "the basic
thrust of the preemption clause, then, was to avoid a multiplicity of
regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of
employee benefit plans."' 9
52. Id.
53. DeBuono, 520 U.S at 816.
54. Id. at 815.
55. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
56. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. at 656-57 (quoting McClendon, 498 U.S. at
142).
57. 120 CONG. REc. 29197 (1974).
58. Id. at 29933.
59. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. at 657.
20031
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 19:2:1
C. The Fifth Circuit's View
Against the background discussed in the previous section, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was called upon to
rule on a Texas statute allowing independent review of medical
necessity determinations made by HMOs.6° At issue in Corporate
Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas Department of Health was a statute that
61purported to regulate the managed health care field in three ways.
The law, Texas Senate Bill 386,62 first created a cause of action against
managed care entities failing to meet an ordinary standard of care for
health care treatment decisions.63 The statute provides that an HMO
has "a duty to exercise ordinary care when making health care
treatment decisions and is liable for damages for harm to an insured or
enrollee proximately caused by its failure to exercise such ordinary
care." 64 Second, the Texas law provided protection for physicians from
retaliation by HMOs and from indemnity clauses they may seek to
impose.65 The anti-indemnification provision of the statute prohibited
the inclusion of indemnification provisions in contracts of physicians
and other medical providers that would hold an HMO harmless for its
own acts.66 The anti-retaliation provision prevented an HMO from
dropping or refusing to renew a doctor's contract when he or she
advocates medically necessary, yet expensive, treatment for patients.67
The third provision at issue in the Texas law established an
independent review procedure whereby patients could challenge
medical necessity decisions made by HMOs.68 Specifically, the law
provided that patients can appeal "adverse determinations," which it
defined as "[a] determination by [an HMO] or utilization review agent
that the health care services furnished or proposed to be furnished to
60. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir.
2000).
61. Id. at 531.
62. Codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 88.001 et seq. (1999); TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.09(e) (West Supp. 2003).
63. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 88.001 et seq. (1999)
64. Id. § 88.002(a).
65. Id. § 88.002(4)(g).
66. See Id. § 88.002(g).
67. Id. § 88.002(f).
68. Id.
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an enrollee are not medically necessary or are not appropriate.""
Additionally, the law requires the HMO to comply with the
determination made by the independent reviewer. ° The Fifth Circuit
dealt with each provision in turn.
As to the first provision, the court did not agree with the argument
that in providing liability against HMOs for negligence, the law
'relate[d] to' an ERISA plan, affected its administration, and was
therefore preempted.7' The court approved of Texas' interpretation
that the statute "avoided the difficult genre of cases complaining of
medical care and service by excluding a duty to provide treatment not
covered by the plan."72 As the court explained, the statute allowed
suits for negligence claims against doctors and imposed vicarious
liability on HMOs for that negligence.73 According to the court,
"ERISA preempts malpractice suits against doctors making coverage
decisions in the administration of a plan, but it does not insulate
physicians from accountability to their state licensing agency or
association charged to enforce professional standards regarding
medical decisions.,
74
Using similar reasoning, the court rejected the preemption of the
anti-indemnification and anti-retaliation portions of the Act. 7' As the
court pointed out in the following excerpt, those portions of the statute
were not the sort of regulation Congress meant ERISA to preempt.
The anti-retaliation and anti-indemnity provisions complement the
Act's liability provisions by realigning the interests of managed care
entities and their doctors. The liability and indemnity provisions force
the managed care entity to share in its doctors' risk of tort liability; the
anti-retaliation provision avoids the situation in which the doctor must
choose between satisfying his professional responsibilities and facing
retaliatory action by the managed care entity. Together, the provisions
thus better preserve the physician's independent judgment in the face
of the managed care entity's incentives for cost containment. Such a
scheme is again the kind of quality of care regulation that has been left
to the states.76
69. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.12A(a)(1) (1997).
70. Id. art. 21.58A § 6A(3).
71. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 534.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 534-35.
75. Id. at 535-36.
76. Id. at 536.
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Finally, the court analyzed the independent review provisions
included in the statute." Under the state statute, an insured patient
may appeal a "determination by [an HMO] or utilization review agent
that the health care services furnished or proposed to be furnished to
an enrollee are not medically necessary or are not appropriate."78 The
act goes on to require that the HMO comply with the determination
made by the independent review agent. 9 The court held that ERISA
preempted these sections of the statute because they provide for an
administrative scheme governing coverage determinations.8 Such an
attempt to provide for a state administrative scheme "is squarely
within the ambit of ERISA's preemptive reach."8
The court further addressed whether the statute was nonetheless
saved under ERISA's saving clause.8 2 The court applied the three-
factor test interpreting the saving clause that the Supreme Court
fashioned in Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Massachusetts.83 The three
factors, known as the McCarran-Ferguson84 factors ask the following:
"(1) whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading the
policyholder's risk; (2) whether it is an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insured and the insurer; and (3) whether the
practice is limited to entities in the insurance industry."85 The state
statute in question need not satisfy each factor in order to be saved
from preemption. 86 The court determined that the second and third
prongs of the test were satisfied because the provisions in question
"are integral to the policy relationship and regulate the insurance
industry." Thus, the court found that the requirements of the saving
clause were met."
The court, however, continued its analysis and stated that even if the
provisions would be saved under the saving clause, they may still be
preempted if found to conflict with a substantive provision of ERISA. 9
77. Id.
78. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.12A(a)(1).
79. Id. art. 21A.58A § 6A(3).
80. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 537.
81. Id.
82. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000).
83. 471 U.S. 724 (1999).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2000).
85. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 537.
86. See UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 373 (1999).
87. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 538.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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Under the Supreme Court's holding in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.
Dedeaux,9° "[judicial] understanding of the saving clause must be
informed by the legislative intent concerning [ERISA's] civil
enforcement provisions."" In Pilot Life, "[t]he Court interpreted
Congress' intent regarding the exclusivity of ERISA's enforcement
scheme very broadly, concluding that the scheme preempts not only
directly conflicting remedial schemes but also supplemental state law
remedies." 92  Since the scheme provided for in the Texas statute
created an alternative remedy for obtaining benefits under an ERISA
plan, the court found that it directly conflicted with ERISA's exclusive
remedy and could not therefore be saved by the saving clause.93
The Fifth Circuit's analysis in Corporate Health94 ultimately brings
the observer back to the conclusion espoused by the Supreme Court in
Travelers,95 Dillingham96 and DeBuono.97  In determining ERISA
preemption issues the courts should focus primarily upon the
legislative intent behind the enactment of the statute. As the next
section will discuss, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
departed from this focus in Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.98
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DEPARTURE
A. Factual Background
Beginning in 1996, Debra Moran began experiencing loss of
function, numbness, pain and decreased mobility in her right
shoulder.99 Ms. Moran visited Dr. Arthur LaMarre, her primary care
physician under her HMO plan, seeking treatment for these
symptoms.10° Rush Prudential is the HMO provider for Ms. Moran's
plan.10
1
90. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
91. Id. at 52.
92. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 538-39 (citing Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 56).
93. Id. at 539.
94. Id.
95. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645.
96. Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 316.
97. DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 806.
98. Moran, 230 F.3d at 959.
99. Id. at 963.
100. Id.
101. Id
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Initially, Dr. LaMarre treated Moran's ailments with physiotherapy
and other conservative treatments, but these methods did not alleviate
her symptoms.1°2  While under Dr. LaMarre's care, Ms. Moran
obtained the name of an out-of-network physician specializing in
micro-reconstructive surgery. 3 Ms. Moran submitted a request to
Rush for a referral to consult with this physician, but her request was
denied.'' Despite this, Ms. Moran arranged to be examined by the
out-of-network physician, Dr. Julia Terzis. Dr. Terzis diagnosed Ms.
Moran with brachial plexopathy and thoracic outlet syndrome (TOS),
a nerve compression syndrome caused by the compression of nerves in
Ms. Moran's brachial plexus. 0 6 While these conditions are generally
treated with therapy, surgery becomes necessary if symptoms persist;'°7
the standard surgical procedure involves the complete removal of the
uppermost rib or removal with scalenectomy - the removal of the rib
and the attached muscle. °8 The surgery recommended by Dr. Terzis,
however, was more involved and thus more expensive.' °9 Dr. Terzis
recommended that Ms. Moran undergo the standard procedure as well
as an additional procedure performed during the operation known as
microneurolysis." ' After having Ms. Moran consult with two plan
doctors who recommended only the standard TOS surgery, Dr.
LaMarre formally asked Rush to approve Dr. Terzis' surgery for Ms.
Moran in October 1997.111
Though Ms. Moran complied with all of Rush's internal petition and
request requirements in order to have the surgery performed, Rush
denied approval for the surgery." 2 In January 1998, Ms. Moran made a
written demand to Rush seeking its compliance with section 4-10 of
Illinois' Health Maintenance Organization Act (HMO Act)."3 The
HMO Act requires HMOs to provide an independent physician review
when a patient's primary care physician disagrees with an HMO about
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 963-64.
113. Id. at 964; See also 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/4-10 (2000).
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the medical necessity of a proposed treatment. 14 When Rush did not
respond to Moran's demand to comply with the statute, Moran elected
to undergo Dr. Terzis' surgery at her own expense."5 Afterwards,
Moran submitted the bill to Rush and filed a complaint in Illinois
circuit court seeking a court order requiring Rush to comply with
section 4-10.1 6 Rush removed the case to federal court citing the
statute's conflict with ERISA, and the case made its way through the
federal courts."
7
The District Court agreed with Rush that ERISA preempted
Moran's claims and granted summary judgment. 18 When the case
reached the Seventh Circuit, the court determined that section 4-10 of
the HMO Act related to an ERISA plan."9 The court determined that
the HMO Act was saved from preemption, however, under ERISA's
saving clause because it "regulate[d] insurance" under a common sense
understanding and met two of the McCarran-Ferguson factors.20 The
court held that, "as a matter of common sense, § 4-10 of the HMO Act
regulates insurance because the law is directed at the HMO industry as
insurers" even though "the law does not affect the entire insurance
industry in Illinois.' 21 In discussing the McCarran-Ferguson factors,
the Seventh Circuit held that section 4-10 met the second factor
because it "creates a mandatory term in the insurance contract and,
thus, changes the bargain between insurer and insured.' 2 The court
considered the third factor satisfied because "the section applies only
to HMOs acting as insurers.' 2 2 The court then briefly pointed out that
the deemer clause was inapplicable in the case because the plan at
124issue is an insured plan, not a self-funded plan.
In addressing the issue that was the undoing of the Texas statute in
Corporate Health Insurance, Co. v. Texas Dep't of Health'25, the court
ruled that section 4-10 of the HMO Act could not be characterized as
114. See Id. § 125/4-10.
115. Moran, 230 F.3d at 964.
116. Id. at 964.
117. Id. at 964-66.
118. Id. at 962.
119. Id. at 968-69.
120. Id. at 969.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 970 (internal citations omitted).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d 526.
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conflicting with ERISA by creating an alternative remedial scheme."'
According to the court's reasoning,
Rather than providing an alternative remedy for Ms. Moran to
recover benefits, § 4-10 of the HMO Act simply establishes an
additional internal mechanism for making decisions about
medical necessity and identifies who will make that decision in
those instances when the HMO and the patient's primary care
physician cannot agree on the medical necessity of a course of
treatment. Rather than eliminate the review procedures
established by the plan, it simply adds to the contract, by
operation of law, an additional dispute resolving mechanism
when, despite exhausting the internal review system otherwise
provided by the plan, there remains a disagreement between the
plan's own experts and the attending physician on the issue of
medical necessity.
1
1
7
Though its analysis nearly mirrored that of the Fifth Circuit up to
this point, the Seventh Circuit departed from the reasoning in
Corporate Health on this critical issue. The court in Corporate Health
felt that the independent review provision of the Texas law set up a
separate remedial scheme through which members could seek to
enforce plan benefits already due them.1 2 According to its view, this
separate scheme conflicted with ERISA and was thus preempted. In
contrast, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that a similar independent
review provision in the Illinois HMO Act simply added a new
contractual term to the plan as a matter of law and thus escaped
preemptiom. The next section of this Note analyzes the Seventh
Circuit's reasoning in Moran and concludes that it is flawed.
B. The Independent Review Provision of the Illinois HMO Act is not
Saved By ERISA's Saving Clause
Moran contends that ERISA's saving clause saves section 4-10 of the
HMO Act from preemption. In determining whether a particular law
regulates insurance under the saving clause, courts must first look to a
common sense reading of the law, 29 then look to the three McCarran-
Ferguson factors, and, finally, analyze whether the questioned law
directly conflicts with the remedial scheme ERISA establishes.3
126. Moran, 230 F.3d at 971.
127. Id. at 971-72.
128. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 538.
129. Ward, 526 U.S. at 367.
130. See, e.g., Corporate Health, 215 F.3d 526.
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As Moran accurately points out, the Illinois law regulates insurance
as a matter of common sense.' Section 4-10 applies to HMO's,
"entities that are engaged in the business of health insurance."'32
Because the law is aimed at the insurance industry, it regulates
insurance under a common sense understanding of the term.
Moran's analysis of the McCarran-Ferguson factors also correctly
determines that section 4-10 regulates insurance."' The second factor
is met because section 4-10 is integral to the policy relationship
between Rush and Moran. The third factor is satisfied because the
provision applies to HMOs acting as insurers.
3 4
Though Moran is correct up to this point, the analysis with regard to
a direct conflict with an ERISA provision, is flawed. Even if a statute
is saved from preemption under the saving clause using the McCarran-
Ferguson factors, it may still be preempted if it can be shown that it
conflicts with a substantive provision of ERISA 35 The Supreme Court
has held repeatedly that its understanding of the saving clause "must
be informed by the legislative intent concerning [ERISA's] civil
enforcement provisions."13 The Court has interpreted the preemptive
effect of ERISA very broadly, allowing it to reach not only those
remedial schemes that directly conflict with its provisions but also
those that seek to supplement them. 37
C. The Independent Review Provision of the HMO Act Conflicts with
ERISA's Exclusive Remedial Scheme
Though the Seventh Circuit held that the independent review
provisions of the HMO Act merely provide an additional internal
decision-making mechanism that serves as an added contract term, it is
clear that this is not the case. Section 4-10 of the HMO Act provides
an additional and alternative remedy through which individuals can
obtain benefits through an ERISA plan and should therefore be
131. Brief for Respondent at 9, Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S.
355 (2002)(No. 00-1021) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
132. Wash. Physicians Serv. Ass'n v. Gregoire, 147 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1141 (1999).
133. Respondent's Brief, supra note 131, at 25. (Though Moran erroneously
finds the first factor to be met, this fact is not fatal to the overall determination
using the McCarran-Ferguson factors because not all three factors need be met.).
134. Corporate Health, 215 F.3d at 538.
135. UNUM, 526 U.S. at 375.
136. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52.
137. Id. at 56.
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preempted because it conflicts with ERISA's exclusive remedial
scheme.
As the Supreme Court previously noted, "[o]ne of the principal
goals of ERISA is to enable employers 'to establish a uniform
administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to
guide processing of claims and disbursement of benefits.""38 That goal
is accomplished in large part through ERISA's exclusive remedies.
Section 502(a) of ERISA provides an exclusive federal remedy for a
plan beneficiary seeking "to recover benefits due to him under the
terms of his plan" or "to enforce his rights under the terms of the
plan."'39 The Court has upheld the exclusivity of this remedy, holding
that:
Congress clearly expressed an intent that the civil enforcement
provisions of ERISA § 502(a) be the exclusive vehicle for actions
for ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting
improper processing of a claim for benefits, and that varying
state causes of action for claims within the scope of § 502(a)
would pose an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of
Congress.'
Along with this exclusive vehicle, Congress intended that a body of
federal common law would be developed to handle issues involving
rights and obligations under ERISA plans.' In the next section, this
Note will discuss the Supreme Court's decision and analyze how it
subverts Congress' goal of creating a uniform mechanism through
which plan beneficiaries can enforce their rights.
IV. THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court narrowly upheld the HMO Act in Rush
142Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran. The majority of the Court ruled
that the statute fell within ERISA's saving clause. However, the
majority departed from the reasoning espoused in its prior case law by
holding that the HMO Act does not conflict with ERISA's exclusive
remedies. The Court explained that the HMO Act does not conflict
with ERISA because it "provides no new cause of action under state
138. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001) (quoting Fort Halifax
Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987)).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
140. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52.
141. 120 CONG. REC. 29942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits).
142. Moran, 536 U.S. at 355.
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law and authorizes no new form of ultimate relief. 1 43 The Court
reasoned that the Act is not preempted because "the relief ultimately
available [under it] would still be what ERISA authorizes in a suit for
benefits under § 1132(a)."'4
Here the Court's reasoning is flawed. Though the ultimate relief
may be the same (i.e., the receipt of, or reimbursement for, medical
services), the relief that was really at issue in this case is the mechanism
whereby Moran can obtain that ultimate relief. That mechanism is the
independent review procedure authorized by the HMO Act that the
dissent characterizes as a "arbitration-like [procedure] to settle
benefits disputes. 1 45 Viewed in this manner, it is not the receipt of
benefits, but the "arbitration [mechanism that] constitutes an
alternative remedy to litigation. ' 46
Section 4-10 of the HMO Act attempts to supplant ERISA's
exclusive remedies and should therefore have been preempted. Debra
Moran sought ultimately to receive the benefits she believed were
"medically necessary" and therefore due to her under the plan as it
was written. 147 The HMO Act does not give Ms. Moran any additional
benefits under the plan; it simply provides her with a different way to
recover plan benefits. By allowing an appeal to an independent
reviewing physician, the Act does not provide for additional care or
medical services under the plan. Rather, it provides an additional
mechanism to force Rush to provide the care that Moran believes is
already covered under the plan. Based on Congressional intent and
case law, the only permissible manner in which to enforce rights
through an ERISA plan is through ERISA's section 502(a)(1)(B).
Now that the Court has ruled otherwise, an ERISA plan
participant's remedy is subject to variation based upon his or her
geography. Participants in the same ERISA-governed plan living in
different states will be afforded different remedies with regard to the
same plan, and will ultimately receive different levels of treatment for
similar conditions. Debra Moran and others in Illinois will receive
independent review of HMO decisions, and thus the surgery
recommended by Dr. Terzis, while participants in the same ERISA
plan from other states will not. Plan administrators are now unable to
143. Id. at 2167.
144. Id.
145. Moran, 536 U.S. at 355, 395. (Thomas, J. dissenting).
146. Id.
147. Brief for Petitioner at 21, Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S.
355 (2002) (No. 00-1021).
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develop "a uniform set of administrative practices, 148 because they
"face the prospect that numerous other States [will] impose their own
distinct requirements - a result squarely inconsistent with the goal of
ERISA preemption.,
149
Over forty states and the District of Columbia currently have laws
providing for independent reviews of medical necessity decisions.150
Now that the Supreme Court has ruled for Moran, ERISA plan
administrators have to conform to the requirements of these differing
state laws. Requiring this of plan administrators will only serve to
ultimately increase the expense of operating a plan and may
discourage employers from offering plans at all. As the Court in Fort
Halifax stated, the resulting "patchwork scheme of regulation" will
cause "considerable inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which
might lead those employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, and
those without such plans to refrain from adopting them." '' This
unfortunate result runs counter to public policy.
Many can empathize with Ms. Moran's position. Like anyone
would, she sought to undergo the medical procedure and obtain the
treatment that she believed would be most likely to relieve her
symptoms. However, in permitting her to obtain that treatment,152 by
using the remedy created in Section 4-10 of the Illinois HMO Act, the
Supreme Court has made it likely that ultimately fewer Americans will
be able to afford healthcare coverage."'
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has erroneously upheld Section 4-10 of the
Illinois HMO Act which provides an additional remedial scheme for
patients insured under ERISA plans. The Court ruled in Moran's
favor over a strong dissent. 54 The court's analysis is premised on
flawed logic and a skewed reading of legislative history.
As previously demonstrated in this Note, the Congressional Record
reveals an intent by Congress to preempt the field through its
enactment of the substantive and enforcement mechanisms provided
148. Id. at 17.
149. Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 17.
150. See supra note 12.
151. Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 11.
152 See Moran, 536 U.S. 355,402. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 388-402.
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for in the ERISA statute1 5 . The Illinois statute at issue in Rush
Prudential clearly provides an additional mechanism whereby insured
patients can enforce their rights under insurance plans. In doing so,
the Illinois statute clearly runs counter to Congressional intent.
While states have the right to exercise their traditional police
powers, states cannot act in any situation where the federal
government has preempted the field. ERISA was enacted to provide
uniformity among insurance and benefit plans, thus reducing the
costliness of the administration of such plans. Section 4-10 of Illinois'
HMO Act runs counter to ERISA's purpose and creates the problems
ERISA was designed to prevent. Now that employee benefit and
welfare plan administrators are forced to conform to the laws of fifty
different states, their costs will necessarily rise. These increased costs
will eventually be passed on to plan employers and participants.
Escalated costs may become so high that employers no longer offer
healthcare plans. 1 6 This result is contrary to public interest.
Case law and Congressional intent point toward upholding a system
that provides uniformity, ease of administration and lower costs for all
involved. Until Congress finds a need either to enact an independent
review provision in a federal patients bill of rights, or to provide for
legislation allowing the states to supplement ERISA individually, the
exclusive remedies ERISA affords should have been permitted to
remain intact."'
154 See 120 CONG. REC. 29197 and 120 CONG. REc. 29933
155 See Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 11.
156 See Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 402. (Thomas, J., dissenting)..
2003]

